University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Published Scholarship

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

1926

Real Property: Landlord and Tenant: The Rule in
Dumpor's Case [Student Comment]
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_scholarship_pub
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Real Property: Landlord and Tenant: The Rule in Dumpor's Case [Student Comment] , 14 CALIF. L. REV. 328 (1926).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_scholarship_pub/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Published Scholarship by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

328

14 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

of public officers during their terms of office.n" The obiter dictum

of County of Humboldt v. Stern" which was decided under a provision of the county government act of 1897,18 similar to section
4290 of the Political Code, was vigorously dissented from by three
justices and it seems to be too broad to require recognition under
the rule of stare decisis.1' While it is true that to allow a public
officer to receive an additional compensation for duties which may
properly be attached to his office would be adverse to the policy of
the law and likely to engender illegal practices in positions of public
trust," yet it is a matter of economy to have the county clerk of a
small county occupy a position the duties of which are foreign to his
office and which are not so burdensome as to interfere with the
proper administration of his former duties. In small counties the
clerk is in close association with the board of supervisors and no
doubt he can perform the duties of a purchasing agent as efficiently
as any person whom the board of supervisors would be compelled
to employ at a higher compensation, without any breach of his
H. H. D.
official duty as county clerk.
REAL PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT: THE RULE IN
DUxon's
JC
The extent to which courts sometimes blindly follow precedent is perhaps no more forcibly evidenced than by the
history of the rule in Dumpor's Case.' Few cases have been more
11 Supra, n. 6.
13 Supra, n. 8.

1s Cal Stats. 1897,5 215, p. 572.

14In re Johnson (1893) 98 Cal. 531, 542, 33 Pac. 460, 21 L. R. A. 380;
Norris v Moody (1890) 84 Cal. 143, 149, 24 Pac. 37. "An obiter dictum is a
gratuitous opinion, an individual impertinence, which, whether it be wise or
foolish,right or wrong, bindeth none, not even the lips that utter it. Old
Judge." Hart v. Stribling (1889) 25 Fla. 435, 446, 6 So. 455.
1n Cf. Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 426.
I Dumpor v. Symms (1603) 4 Co. Rep. 119b, 76 Eng. Rep. R. 1110. The authorities for the rule given in the case are Leedes and Compton's Case (1587) 1
Rolle Abr. 472, Godbelt 93, 78 Eng. Rep. R. 57; Winter's Case (1572) Dyer
308, 73 Eng. Rep. R. 697; and Anon. (1558) Dyer 152, 73, Eng. Rep. R. 331.
In a very learned article in 7 American Law Review, 616-640, Mr. Joseph
Willard shows that these cases do not stand for the propositions cited for
in Dumpor's case. The rule was not again applied until nearly two hundred
Aears later in the case of Brummell v. Macpherson (1807) 14 Ves. Jr. 173. 33
.ng. Rep. R. 487, 488 in which Lord Eldon declared "though Dumports Case
always struck me as extraordinary it is the law of the land at this day." The
rile was again followed five years later in the case of Doe v. Bliss (1812) 4
Taunt 735, 128 Eng. Rep. R. 519, 520 at which time Mansfield, C. J.. said.
"Certainly the profession have always wondered at Dumpor's Case but it
has been law so many centuries that we cannot now reverse it." In Macher
v. Foundling Hospital (1813) 1 Ves. & B. 188, 35 Eng. Rep. R. 74, although
Lord Eldon thought Dumpor's Case was not a very good decision originally
he felt that it was none the less settled law. With the same apologies for its
unreasonableness several American courts have purported to follow the rule.
Reid v. John F. Wiessner Brewing Co. (189) 88 Md. 234, 40 Atl. 877; Aste
v. Putnam's Hotel Co. (1923) 247 Mass. 147, 141 N. E. 66, 31 A. L. RI
149; Pennock v.Lyons (1875) 118 Mass. 92; Siefke v. Koch (186) 31 How.
Pr. (N. Y.) 383; Heeter v.Eckstein (1874) 50 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 445;
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severely attacked,2 few errors have so persistently weathered the
storm of universal condemnation. The case decided that a condition
of forfeiture in a lease that the lessee and his assigns should not
assign it without the consent of the lessor was destroyed by a consent

to one assignment so that the lease would not be forfeited by an
assignment by the assignee without consent. The reason given in
support of the rule was that the condition was not apportionable by
the act of the parties, that when the license was given the lessee had
an interest which was free from any restriction against assignment
so that when the assignment was made the assignee got the same
interest which the lessee had. The reasoning seems clearly unsound.
The license was not to commit a breach of the condition but was a
consent to assign without which there would have been a breach had
an assignment been made.' In acquiring the license the lessee complied with the condition. It is difficult to see why such compliance
should remove the condition, the license being granted to the lessee
and not to his assigns. It is sometimes said that the hostility of the
law to restrictions on alienation of land is the real reason for the
rule.' If such be the case an extremely technical and unreasonable
method has indeed been employed to reach that end. Some justification might be found for the rule in that the license given in
Dumpor's Case permitted the lessee to assign to any one whomsoMurray v. Harway (1874) 56 N. Y. 337; Conger v. Duryee (1882) 90 N. Y.
594; Fischer v. Ginzburg (1920) 191 App. Div. 418, 181 N. Y. Supp. 516;
Easley Coal Co v. Brush Creek Coal Co. (1922) 91 W. Va. 291, 112 S. E. 512.
2 For example Mr. Joseph Willard in his most excellent article referred
to above, sums his argument as follows: "We conceive, therefore, that we
have shown that the rule in question was never good law, of recognized
authority or in accord with modern decisions; that to overrule it, or, rather,
to repudiate its imaginary authority, will not only relieve the law of today
of an incubus and bring our system of real property into harmony with
common sense; but will, in so doing. involve little or no disturbance to settled
titles or vested rights of ownership. And, finally, that the argument of long
standing, which is the whole and only ground of acquiescence in its authority
by modern judgcs. ought, in view of these facts, to avail nothing; as an
admitted error should receive no greater tolerance, merely because it is venerable." 7 American Law Review, 616. 640.
'The rule has been held to apply only to the case of a license before
breach, and that the mere waiver of the breach after it has occurred does
not destroy the condition. Macher v. Foundling Hospital, supra, n. 1; Doe
v. Bliss (1812) 4 Taunt. 735, 128 Eng. Rep. R. 519. Obiter: Doe d. Griffith
v. Pritchard (1883) 5 Barn. & Adol. 765, 2 N. & M. 489, 3 L. J, K. B. 11, 110
Eng. Rep. R. 973; Seaver v. Coburn (1852) 64 Mass. 324. In New York however the rule was applied where there was only a waiver and not a license.
Murray v. Harway, supra, n. 1. Koehler v. Brady (1897) 22 App. Div. 624,
4' N. Y. Supp. 984. The rule does not apply to subleases. Albig v. Morton
(1905) 33 Pa. Co. Ct. 93; Fidelity Trust Co. v. Kohn (1904) 27 Pa. Super.
Ct 374; Miller v. Newton-Humphreyville Co. (1920) 116 Atl. 325 (N. J. Eq.);
Conger v. Duryee (1882) 90 N. Y. 594; Huter v. Eckstein (1874) 50 How.
Pr. 445; Farr v. Kenyon (1898) 20 R. I. 376, 39 Ati. 241; McKildoe v.
Darracott (1856)13 Gratt. (Va. 827.)
ARestraints on the alienation of an estate for years have generally been
recognized as valid. Nave v. Berry (1853) 22 Ala. 382; Kew v. Trainor

(1874) 150 Ill. 150. 37 N. E. 223; Crowe v. Riley (1900) 63 Ohio St. 1, 57
N. E. 956. Gray, Restraints on Alienation (2d ed.) p. 101.
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ever. It might be argued that the assignee should not be presumed
likely to assign to a more undesirable person than the lessee who has
been given a free hand in the matter. However in Brummell v.
Macpherson' the rule in Dumpor's Case was applied when the license
given was to assign the lease to a particular assignee. This case,
as well as several which have followed it, is really an illegitimate offspring of Dumpor's Case and no justification can be found for it.
-While no court has attempted to justify the rule few have had
the temerity openly to overrule it. An Act of Parliament' changed
the rule in England but many states in this country still purport to
follow it, among them California.$ Although the courts of this
state have said that the rule in Dumpor's Case obtains here, the
precise question in Dumpor's Case has never been presented to the
courts for decision. The first case in this state in which the question
arose and the case most frequently cited as the one adopting the rule
here is that of Chipman v. Emeric.* The lease in that case provided
that the lessee should not assign to any person without obtaining the
consent of the lessor. The lessee assigned the leasehold to the def endant with the consent of the lessor. It was held that since the first
assignment was made with the consent of the lessor such license
once given "was sufficient to abrogate the covenant against assignment". 10 As in Brummell v. Macpherson the real mischief of the
case lies in the fact that the rule is made to operate even when the
license was to assign to a particular person and not a general license
as in Dumpor's Case itself. Furthermore, in the absence of a reservation in the lease, or a grant by statute of a right of entry for
breach of the covenants, the rule in Dumpor's Case has no proper
application to a covenant. If the case stands for the proposition
that a covenant against assignment is removed by one consent it
is clearly unsupported by Dumpor's Case.11 It is important to distinguish a covenant from a condition. A breach of a covenant against
assignment without consent, in the absence of contrary statutory
provisions, does not give the landlord a right of forfeiture but merely
3Supra, n. 1.

* In Investor's Guaranty Corporation v. Thompson (1924) 31 Wyo. 264.
225 Pac. 590, the rule is repudiated after a thorough analysis of its history and
purported applications.
'22 & 23 Vict. c. 38, 1 6 (1859).

* Chipman v. Emeric (1855) 5 Cal. 49, 63 Am. Dec. 80; German American

Say. Bank v. Gollmer (1909) 155 Cal. 683, 102 Pac. 932; 24 L. R. A. (N. S.)
Randol v. Tatum (1893) 98 Cal. 390, 33 Pac. 433; Rothrock v. Sanborn
(1918) 178 Cal. 693. 194 Pac. 314. See the criticism of Chipman v. Emeric
and other cases by Mr. Justice Blume in Investor's Guaranty Corporation v.
Thompson, supra, n. 6.

*Supra, n. 8.
1
*Chipman v. Emeric, 5 Cal 49, 50.
1A Paul v. Nurse (1828) 2 Moody & R. 525, 8 Barn. & C. 486, 7 L. J., K.
B. 12, 108 Eng. Rep. R. 1123; Gannett v. Albree (1869) 103 Mass. 37.
There was no covenant in Dumpor's Case but in Brummell v. Macpherson,
supra, n. 1, it was admitted that if the lease in question had contained a
covenant the covenant would have remained after the condition had been
removed. See 12 Harvard Law Review, 272.
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gives him a right of action for damages. The covenant against assignment remains after one consent even though the condition be
removed. A covenant not to assign without license is one which
touches or concerns the land and therefore runs with it binding
subsequent assignees.13 However a clause in the lease providing for
re-entry for breach of covenants in effect constitutes a condition."
In California and a number of other states, statutes have been
adopted authorizing the landlord to resume possession for the breach
of covenants in the lease.' The California Code of Civil Procedure
grants the landlord a right of forfeiture if the lessee assigns without
consent in violation of a covenant requiring consent."
It thus
appears that a mere covenant against assignment without consent
has, by virtue of the California Code, the effect of a condition. Therefore if Dumpor's Case is law in this state it would seem, under a
covenant forbidding assignment without consent of the lessor, that
by once giving a license to assign, the lessor waives thereafter the
right to re-entry granted to him by the Code for the breach of that
particular covenant.
In German American Savings Bank v. Gollmer, 1 there was a
stipulation in the lease that the premises were let for banking business purposes and that no other business was to be conducted therein
without the lessor's consent in writing. The lease also contained
a covenant against assignment without the consent of the lessor with
a provision for re-entry in the event of a breach thereof. The court
refused to allow the contention that the consent to or waiver by the
lessor of a condition in the lease against assignment wiped out the
other condition in the lease that no other business was to be conducted
therein without the lessor's consent in writing. It is evident that
the case does not adopt the rule of Dumpor's Case. To be sure the
rule was recognized by way of dictum but in reaching the actual
decision the court found the rule did not apply to the exact question
at hand."
" McEachern v. Colton [1902] A. C. 104, 71 L. J., P. C. (N. S.) 20;
(1868) L. R. 3 Q. B.739,37 L. J.,Q. B. (N. S.) 231. 19 L. T. (N. S.) 238. In

Varley v. Coppard (1872) L. R. 7 C. P. 505, 26 L. T. 882; Williams v. Earle

the case of In re Robert Stephenson [19151 1 Ch. 802, 84 L. J., Ch. 563, 113 L.
T. 230, 31 T. L. R. 331, the covenant against assignment without consent was
held bindinR even though assigns were not mentioned in the covenant. See
2 Br. Rul. Cas. 8, 809; Tiffany, Landlord & Tenant, 1152, p. 936.
" Winn v. State (1892) 55 Ark. 360, 18 S. W. 375; Wheeler v. Earle
(1849) 59 Mass. 31, 51 Am. Dec. 41; Hurd v. Suravitz (1892) 148 Penn. St.
202, 123 Atl. 1117.
6Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 1 1161 (1872); Cal. Civ. Code, 1 791 (1872);
Arizona Rev. Stats. 1 2693; Florida Gen. Stats. 11 1906, 26; Illinois, Hurd's
Rev. Stats. 1905, c. 80, 1 9; Indiana, Burns' Ann. Stats. 1911, 1 7092; Kansas.
Gen. Stats. 1905, 1 4057, 4058; Mass. Rev. Laws 1902, c. 129, 111; Missour:
Rev. Stats. 1899, 4108.
2 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. 11161 (3).

t1Supra,
n. 8
Randol v. Tatum, supra, n. 8, is also often cited

for the proposition
1?
that Dumpor's Case is law in this state. In that case the lease contained
both a condition that the term might be forfeited if assigned without consent
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The latest California case in which the rule was applied was in
the Superior Court of Los Angeles in the case of Kendis v. Cohn.s
In that case the lease contained both an express condition and a
covenant against assignment without consent and the condition and
covenants were made binding on both the lessees and their assigns.
A further clause in the lease provided that "Said lessees may with
the written consent of said lessors assign said lease to any person or
persons of good character and repute and satisfactory to the lessors
upon furnishing good and sufficient security to be approved by said
lessors." The defendants had given written consent to assign to the
plaintiff, the lessee's assignee. The plaintiff was denied damages
in a suit against the lessor for an arbitrary refusal of the lessors to
examine into the qualifications of the proposed assignee. However
it was held that such refusal entitled the lessee to make the assignment without the consent if the person proposed were of good char.
acter and repute." The court held by way of dictum that there was
no forfeiture because Dumpor's Case obtained in this state.
and a covenant not to assign. The lessor gave the tenants written permission
to assign to the defendant. The defendant later assigned the lease and his
assignee in turn assigned the lease. The last two assignments were made
without the consent of the lessor in writing or otherwise. The action in the
case was against the defendant as surety upon a bond given by the lessee to
secure the payment of rent. It was held that the sureties were discharged
by the tender of rent by an assignee of the term. The landlord accepted
rent from a third party after knowledge of the two assignments. The court
held that this acceptance waived the forfeiture of the lease for breach of a
condition tn assign the lease without written consent. The court dearly did
not follow Dumpor's Case. On the contrary it assumes that the condition
continues after the first assignment for it declared that the assignments

without the consent of the landlord were breaches of the condition and the

covenant but that the lessor had the option to forfeit the lease for breach
of the condition but that he had not the option of declaring the assignment
void, the only remedy for the violation of the covenant being an action for
its breach.
In Rothrock v. Sanborn, supra, n. 8, there was a stipulation in the consent
of the landlord to the first assignment to the effect that "this consent shall
not be treated in any way as waiving any of the provisions of said lease nor
shall the same be assigned by the said Mrs. Nel. L. Rothrock [lessee's
assignee] to any person without our consent first being obtained." This
stipulation does not seem to have influenced the court for it based its decision
upon the fact that a provision of the lease provided that assignment could
only be made with the consent of the lessors and thus seems to have ignored
Dumpor's case altogether. However the stipulation quoted would have
avoided the rule had the court recognized Dumpor's Case. In fact that is the
best method of avoiding the effect of the rule. It has been held, however,
that a provision in the license that the assignee shall hold subject to the
performance of the covenants and conditions in the original lease is sufficient
to make the condition operative against assigns. Kew v. Trainor (1894) 150
Ill. 150, 37 N. E. 223; see also Hartford Deposit Co. v. Rosenthal (1915)
192 Ill. App. 211.
18 San Francisco Recorder, Monday, October 26, 1925.

I*If the lease simply provides that there is to be no assignment without
the lessor's consent it seems the lessor has the right to refuse to consent even
though motivated by mere caprice and whim. Hill v. Rudd (1890) 99 Ky.
178, 35 S. W. 270; Girard Trust Co. v. Cosgrove (1921) 270 Penn. St. 570.
113 Atl. 741; A. Harris & Co. v. Campbell (1916) 187 S. W. 365 (Tex. Civ.
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Should the question be presented to the courts in the future, the
rule in Dumpor's Case, especially as illegitimately extended by Brummell v. Macpherson to cases where the consent is to assign to a
particular person, should not be followed. It was originally without
foundation and at the present time is universally condemned as
entirely without reason or common sense to support it. If no law
should survive the reasons upon which it is founded surely it should
not be perpetuated if it is founded upon no reason at all.

R. J. T.

App.) If the lease further provides for.consent in case of person satisfactory
or acceptable respectable or responsible, or that consent shall not be unreasonably or arbitrarily withheld, the lessor will not have the right arbitrarily
to refuse consent if the proposed assignee is a man of good character and
repute. Willmott v. London Road Car Co. [1910] 2 Ch. 525, 103 L. T. 447,
20 Ann. Cas. 733* Underwood Typewuiter Co. v. Century Realty Co. (1909)
220 Mo. 522, 119 §. W. 400,25 L.R A. (N. S.) 1173. For a complete review
of the cases dealing with the right of the landlord to withhold consent to
an assignment or subletting where the lease contains a provision relating to
consent see 11 Br. Rul. Cas. 876.

